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Believing Where the Action Is: Reply to van Leeuwen

Neil van Leeuwen has used the phenomena of semi-pretense and layered pretense for a reconceptualization of pretense, or better a new image of pretense.​[1]​ The thrust is that mental imagery should be given its due role in guiding pretense action. I deem this utterly plausible in principle, yet I want to recommend caution: (i) the role of mental imagery in comparison to belief-like attitudes should not be overstated; as a consequence, (ii) the explanatory achievement of belief-based accounts hitherto offered should not be underestimated. Indeed they seem of crucial importance to van Leeuwen’s own project. Van Leeuwen’s achievement supplements but cannot supplant them.
I begin with a telling terminological point. Van Leeuwen reserves “pretense” for behaviour and “imagination” for mental activity; at the same time “imagination” is given a twist towards imagery as already becomes obvious in the title of his article.​[2]​ This terminology is all but innocent; it tends to obfuscate the role of cognitive-propositional ingredients of pretense as the latter is usually confined, comprising as well certain kinds of everyday behaviour as, for instance, Shakespeare’s plays or highly complicated pieces of discourse as analysed by philosophical fictionalism.​[3]​ I will use “pretense” in the broader sense, firstly in order to reverse van Leeuwen’s rhetorical twist, and secondly because there is no alternative, “fiction” not covering simple pretense action, “make believe” calling for a belief-based account of the sort van Leeuwen eschews.
I begin with van Leeuwen’s attack on what he dubs the conditional belief account of pretense, embodied in the theory of Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich. Although I basically agree with van Leeuwen’s criticism, it does not hit the overall endeavour of dealing with pretense exclusively in terms of (something like) belief and desire; rather it uncovers certain internal flaws of Nichols & Stich’s account. The conditional belief account is resumed thus:

If it were the case that p, then it would (or might) be the case that q1 & q2 & … & qn where p is the pretence premiss and q1 & q2 &…& qn are the representations in the PWB [possible worlds box]. These beliefs, along with the desire to behave in a way that is similar to the way one would behave if p were the case, lead to the pretence behaviour…​[4]​

Van Leeuwen presents two main criticisms:​[5]​ firstly, the account cannot deal with outlandish pretense, for instance two improvisers who first pretend to be in a duel, then suddenly pretend to mount pterodactyls and to continue their fight in a flight; surely they wouldn’t believe that if they were in a duel, they would mount pterodactyls. Secondly, Nichols & Stich cannot account for iterated or layered pretense: e.g. James Dean and Natalie Wood, in playing the rebellish youngsters in Rebel Without a Cause, pretend to be a married adult couple buying a house. 
What concerns the first criticism, I am puzzled that Nichols & Stich have not anticipated it; after all, they refer to the phenomenon as embellishment in reporting the results of their psychological pretense experiments: 

Our post-pretense interviews indicated that some of these elaborations cohere with the decisions and choices that the person pretending would actually make. In other cases, however, the elaborations depart from what the person would actually decide, sometimes quite radically. Thus, for example, in one of our fancy restaurant pretenses, the waiter pretended to decapitate one of the diners! A theory of pretense needs to be able to accommodate these kinds of elaborations as well as the more sober inferential elaborations.​[6]​

To judge in how far the conditional belief account can accommodate embellishment, some confusion must be dissolved first: Nichols and Stich (and van Leeuwen following them) confound conditional beliefs with counterfactuals. However, as everyone familiar with the debate on conditionals knows, there is a difference. There is considerable debate as to whether conditional belief should be expressed by indicative conditionals or by conditional credence reflecting conditional probabilities (provided there is a difference),​[7]​ yet virtually everyone agrees that counterfactuals as usually expressed by subjunctive conditionals convey something different. To repeat the famous example, we tend to reject ‘if Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have’ but tend to accept ‘if Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did’. And if one of these expresses conditional belief, the latter does. Unfortunately, using conditional belief fares no better with regard to outlandish pretense / embellishment than using counterfactuals. For given we come to believe we are in a duel, of course we do not thereby come to believe that we mount pterodactyls.
So I agree that the conditional belief account as it stands won’t do. Yet van Leeuwen’s real target must be the overall approach to pretense purely in terms of belief-like attitudes as opposed to imagery, not merely Nichols and Stich’s variant. And that approach leaves room for maneouvre. We may presume that the belief account of pretense is closely tied to the notion of truth in fiction. For where there is truth, we might suspect belief as an attitude towards it as well. How are we to spell out truth in pretense / fiction such as to make room for embellishment? While David Lewis’ nearness analysis faces defeat, Kendall Walton’s pluralistic account could serve the task.​[8]​ By Walton’s lights, the pretense premiss, for instance what is explicitly told in a story, serves as a prop for a game of make believe. Certain principles of generation together with the pretense premiss create a set of fictional propositions, or a fictional world. Walton insists that we may track or miss what is true in the fiction. So there must be some belief-like attitude I call fictional belief, which is suited for tracking truth in fiction. I have a fictional belief that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street. There is a caveat, though. Although Walton speaks of fictional propositions and fictional truths, he insists with good reasons that truth and fictional truth do not form species of a single genus.​[9]​ The latter is not as well-behaved as the former; for instance, it allows for inconsistencies, and fictional worlds are incomplete. Still the similarities to actual truth and truth-directed belief justify talking of a belief-based account of pretense.
Walton does not provide an ordered system of principles of generation, yet he notes that a reality principle – the fiction should be as close to actuality as compatible with the pretense premiss – and a mutual belief principle – shared relevant beliefs should be true in the fiction – might play some role.​[10]​ We should add a principle of embellishment. If we insist on a purely cognitive account of pretense, we may construe embellishment as a combinatorial play with concept-like representations. Yet I deem it more plausible that mental imagery plays a role. As preluded in Kant’s free play of the imagination, dispositions to form mental images, associations, emotions may be unleashed; the resulting adornements are traded against other principles of generation. What is decisive is that our fictional beliefs keep track of what is imagined. If we want to uphold the overall account of Nichols & Stich, we may preserve the “possible worlds box”(PWB), a set of belief-like attitudes playing a common causal-functional role, and fill it in Walton’s way. The causal-functional role is played by principles of generation, practices of scorekeeping, behavioural consequences and so on. The price is that we lose the neat connection to counterfactual thinking and conditional belief (which cannot be upheld anyway) and the evolutionary explanation of the PWB by the role of hypothetical thinking in everyday life. 
Now iterated or layered fiction is easily come by. When there is a fiction (being adults) in a fiction (being youngsters pretending to be adults), fictional truth and fictional beliefs are iterated: It is true in fiction1 (and should be believed relative to fiction1) that the persons played by Dean and Wood are rebellish youngsters, and it is true relative to fiction2 as embedded in fiction1 (and should be believed as true in fiction2 as embedded in fiction1) that they are adults. Comparable to second-order beliefs in the belief box, suitable scorekeeping rules should enable us to implement the causal-functional role of layered fictional truth within the PWB. An example of scorekeeping: Whenever p is true in fiction2 as embedded in fiction1, it is true in fiction1 that there is a fiction2 in which p is true; yet normally it is not true in the embedded fiction2 that there is an embedding fiction1. Since van Leeuwen accounts for pretense being layered exclusively in terms of beliefs playing a commenting role, he needs a comparable apparatus anyway.​[11]​
Van Leeuwen focuses on pretense behaviour and emotional response to pretense. Both have in common that they are as real as normal behaviour and normal emotions, but the fiction replaces the way things actually are in explaining them. I deem Nichols & Stich’s approach to pretense behaviour in terms of real desire and van Leeuwen’s idea that sometimes real emotions are at stake convincing. Regarding pretense behaviour, van Leeuwen does nothing to rule out Nichols and Stich’s recipe: assume there is a salient set of similarities between fictional truths and certain propositions suited for actual truth. Then the pretender may entertain a real desire to act in a way that is similar to what is true in the fiction. For instance, Dean and Wood may really act from a real desire to act in a way that is similar to the way the young couple in the fiction acts, including the latter’s acting in a way that is similar to the way adults behave in the embedded fiction. But they must keep score: they should not behave as young rebels while pretending to buy a house. And we have seen that van Leeuwen, too, grants that cognitive attitudes alone, not mental imagery, impose the constraints of layering pretense on our behaviour. Emotions towards fiction are more intricate but leave a lot of room for manoeuvre. The philosophical debate on our emotional response to fiction mostly draws on belief-like attitudes.​[12]​ Again van Leeuwen does nothing to rule out a purely cognitive view. All he says is that imagery “…has far greater emotional impact than bare, propositional imagining.”(van Leeuwen, op. cit., p. 69) But greater overall impact does not ensure that imagery has any role in pretense. 
So far there is no compelling reason to abandon a pure belief-based account. What about the phenomenon of semi-pretense uncovered by van Leeuwen? I contrast van Leeuwen’s favourite example and his definition of semi-pretense. The example first:

Jennifer and Leroy are at a pool on a summer day, watching other children jump off the high-dive. One clumsy child almost trips off the end of the board and falls into the water at an awkward angle with arms waving. “Two,” says Leroy, holding up two fingers with a frown. “I give him a one,” says Jennifer, holding up a finger. Next a young woman springs off the board, glides in a swan dive, and enters the water with hardly a splash. “Ten,” they both shout, holding up ten fingers each.




Action A by subject S is semi-pretense if, and only if: 
(i)	S has a mental image M in the object-imitated role that influences the action recipe or forward model that eventuates in A, and 
(ii)	S lacks the desire or intention to pretend to do the action represented in M.​[14]​

Does the way the example is described make it a mandatory case of semi-pretense as van Leeuwen has it?  I doubt it, offering the following purely cognitive analysis of the situation as described: belief usually is vague. Watching Jerry Fodor’s lively manner, someone may say ‘that’s just Jerry’ without being able to make precise what Fodor has to do to justify the verdict. And we should not think of belief and desire as something that must be explicitly, consciously, occurrently entertained or apt to be reported when one is asked. Given these cursory precautions, nothing prevents me from ascribing to Jennifer and Leroy a vague desire to act like that, ‘that’ referring to a rudimentary fiction of ranking dives. The guiding fictional beliefs are that dives are compared, numbers uttered, fingers raised etc.. Everything else is open. The fictional world is very incomplete. Jennifer and Leroy can tell that, in the fiction which informs their desire to act like that, dives are compared, numbers uttered, fingers raised etc.; but just as we cannot count the individual hairs on Sherlock Holmes’ head, they cannot tell whether, in the fiction, it is true that they “wear polo shirts, speak in officious tones, and hold up placards with numbers,” or that they “just say things like, ‘that dive was pretty good.’” The fiction is incomplete with regard to these features. This description seems as perfectly to fit the example as van Leeuwen’s. So we have not yet been given a clear case that fulfils van Leeuwen’s definition of semi-pretense. A more convincing case might be manner: an action is performed in a peculiar but inexplicable way.​[15]​ There is no intention to perform it that way. One just playfully follows a model image of some earlier action one has in mind. But the farther away one’s manner of acting is from belief-like attitudes concerning the subject of one’s pretense, the more difficult it will be to give evidence that anything pretense-like is involved.​[16]​ Mimesis is not yet (semi-)pretense. A parrot mimicking human speech does not pretend to speak.
So far I have tried to argue that van Leeuwen has successfully ruled out a purely belief-based account of pretense. Now I want to argue that his own approach cannot do without a belief-based account. I believe that Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street. This seems to be true in the fiction. And we may wonder whether van Leeuwen pays due respect to it. He does not provide a model of fictional truth and a belief-like attitude towards it.  He compares the way cognitive attitudes and mental imagery cooperate in pretense to a Cartesian plane which needs to be glossed.​[17]​ Once the plane is glossed, it can bear the whole weight of mathematical proof. In a similar vein, once mental imagery is triggered and commented by the pretense premiss and some additional beliefs, it alone mediates the connection to pretense behaviour: 

cognitive and conative (propositional) attitudes help cause perceptually formatted (or other spatially rich) imaginings, but those imaginings are most immediate to the production of both pretense action and emotion. At the same time, cognitive and conative attitudes that comment on the rich imaginings keep track of which layer of pretense a rich imagining represents.​[18]​

Cognitive attitudes tend to be reduced to initiating mental imagery and commenting the layers of pretense. However, even the latter function imposes strong requirements on our descriptive and cognitive abilities. Mental imagery will often be semantically underspecified. When Dr. Johnson imagines Macbeth meeting his destiny, his mental imagery may contain some spatially rich image of a heavy, bearded, dark-haired man dressed in a medieval armour being stabbed by some other person. Yet this scenery as such, a man being stabbed by another man, is severely underspecified. Johnson must form a lot of concomitant belief-like attitudes regarding what is true in Macbeth, Macbeth’s treason, the moral nature of treason, the causal chain from rise to fall. To be sure, van Leeuwen’s analogy to glossing a Cartesian plane involves a demanding picture of the role propositional attitudes (or something like that) play in fiction. They invest a spatial image with mathematical meaning; then the image may contribute on its own to finding mathematical truth. Yet van Leeuwen does nothing to elucidate the nature of the corresponding cognitive attitudes towards fiction; how they invest mental imagery with propositional content (or something of that sort); what it means for the imagery of the stabbed man to convey that, in the fiction, Macbeth meets his destiny. More importantly, van Leeuwen does nothing to elucidate what fiction / pretense is as contrasted to, say, mathematical truth as rendered by the image of a Cartesian plane; so we are at a loss what it is for a commenting attitude to conjure up a piece of imagery as fiction / pretense. For instance, when we form “a belief that that is an imaginary skunk, where the <that> constituent this time has its content given by the skunk mental image,” we are at a loss what it means for a skunk to be imaginary in the pretense-generating sense.​[19]​ The semantics of fiction is the blindspot of van Leeuwen’s approach which the accounts he criticizes try to overcome. So he had better not eschew belief-based accounts but rather supplement them by imagery.
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